
 <p><b><u>Norbert Merkovity</u></b></p>	 <p><b><u>10-15 minutes</u></b></p>	<p>Thing to remember:</p> <p>The progressive online migration of political institutions creates significantly different power relationships.</p>
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## New Security Regimes?

### On accountability

Since the early 1980s there has been an ongoing public sector ‘reform’ including how accountability functions in the public service. The kinds of neo-liberal restructuring and austerity measures that are so prevalent in the mass media as ‘new issues’ posited as crises that we must deal with immediately, are in reality part of 30- and 40-year-old processes begun in the early 1980s, that Central European countries joined immediately in the ‘transitions’ in the late 1980s.

Reforms shift the ways that media operates as a capitalist enterprise, and how media exists as a technological phenomenon. As well, how new security regimes have developed in the recent decade, have also influenced what we think about accountability.

The regulations ended in shift how regimes work.

- ▶ Radicalization
- ▶ Sedition
- ▶ Self-Regulation

### Radicalization

While an important tool, anti-radical strategies should not be a panacea to the issue of homegrown terror. In terms of the former, there are 4 common issues:

- 1) scope and definition – how do we define what constitutes radicalized behaviour,
- 2) target audience – who are programs targeted at and at what stage do people become subject to these initiatives,
- 3) management - who has oversight of programs, and
- 4) choice - can people “opt-out” of these programs?

In addition to these specific problems the governance of these programs typically suffers from general problems related to “confusion of purpose,” political meddling and goal over-reach.

From a public policy perspective and for its many problems, the anti-radicalization agenda presents the best way we have of managing homegrown Islamist inspired terror. Given the depth and complexity of this problem this must be an exercise in cautious expectation management. Governments usually set-up programmes that try to fight against radicalizations. These programs even if they are run perfectly and capture the right audience at the right time will not completely mitigate Islamist inspired extremism nor with this agenda “straighten out” every would-be potential terrorist.

Governments have the opportunity to get it right and deploy a well- resourced, well thought out and coordinated initiatives to address the multi-faceted problem: including homegrown Islamist extremism,( be it ISIS-inspired), white-power / (Australian Defence League), or the importation of conflicts from other parts of the world.

**Sedition** (visible behaviour that tends toward insurrection against the established order)

Sedition has made a comeback. This is obviously coupled with a kind of nationalism that is a retrograde type of nationalism: post-Cold War = pre- WW1 dissolution of Empire.

All this talk of regulating radicalization has pushed a kind of policy and media agenda that is characterized by these retrograde arguments.

Talk of doing away with dual/multiple citizenships – sending people ‘back to where they came from’. For some people, an ethno-nationalist position seems to be a good regulatory policy

solution: retracting citizenships from people who go to fight in specific conflicts.

Again, none of this is new, but the idea of regulation in the ‘new governance’ framework is not about universalism. These are very specific conflicts, and even specific ‘sides’ to the conflicts, and only specific ‘types’ of sedition. Goes back to my original comment about the ‘character’ of post-Cold War nationalism: this is at least in part, a regulatory phenomenon.

## Self-Regulation

In this context, politics and ‘the political’, is faced with at least two major challenges:

- One, technology and technological design is limited by the pro-sumption that pushes ‘choice’ on to the consumer in a particular way – the assumption that interaction with capitalism is the same as political participation. The ‘design’ of online voting, for example, is already assumed to be a political ‘good’; the design of devices to accommodate social media is assumed to be a ‘political’ good – interacting with capitalism is assumed to be a political end-point and since we assume at least a level of ‘self-regulation’, there is a kind of dangerous complacency. This means that politics is viewed in terms of participants in a producer-consumer nexus, with a set of blurred lines among the two, privileging a post-neo-liberal subject and thus ‘politics’ is altered within this (hegemonic, and/or universal) value framework.

And just in case it isn’t then we are [sous-veilled](#), we watch each other and are watched and observed ‘from below’ – never mind the government-level top-down surveillance, we are already always observed and observing.

- Two, surveillance from below, or ‘sous-veillance’, guarantees that individuals will feed a social media structure with an endless stream of data – so ‘regulation’ then is a kind of penned-in subject. In such a post-bureaucratic state, it is not necessary to set up surveillance systems by any state authority; it is only necessary to mine data, and have the penned in subjects watch each other.

Monitoring each other in a set of hegemonic practices means that the spatial dynamics of life will continue to change towards doing away with those spaces

entirely: ‘hot desks’ for universities and schools, more ‘mobile learning’ in educational institutions means that teachers, parents, children, and all of the subjects of educational institutions can be finally atomised and surveilled simultaneously.

## Conclusion

The progressive online migration of political institutions creates significantly different power relationships. These power relationships are structural as well as theoretical.

**It raises a series of questions about political agency, authenticity, participation, and so on.**

This ensures that governance occurs, in at least two ways: ‘best practice’ will always be determined by choice rather than expertise; and responsibility/obligation will disappear in to the market. Post-neo-liberal already means that a clear hegemony is operating, and that all of the ‘correct indicators’ are in place.

In the end where will we be with [prosumption](#) and sous-veillance and this form of regulation?

Is this really the final logic of the camps, as [Agamben](#) has claimed?

**Are we all permanently tattooed?**

*Are there ways out?*


Switching identities, moving your own data around, making your own data obsolete/defunct

These are all helpful in making the data sets themselves redundant.

Perhaps the major leaks of data are most instructive in that framework – telling us that mediatization and capitalization of our lives is complete, and the previous forms of resistance and guarantees have changed forever...

Is this the future of international politics? <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4B6YTpHfrQ>

## Progress



## Questions

1. What did accountability with the states from the 1980's?
2. What did the state reforms bring in front?
3. What resulted because of *radicalization*?
4. What is *sedition*?
5. What resulted because of *sedition*?
6. What means technology and technological design for *self-regulation*?
7. What means surveillance for *self-regulation*?
8. What cause migration to online platforms of political institutions?
9. Could you put the strategies of states into neorealist or neoliberal context?
10. Can you tell any solution to this problem?

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